Aspect-switching and visual phenomenal character

Philosophical Quarterly 59 (236):508-518 (2009)
John Searle and Susanna Siegel have argued that cases of aspect-switching show that visual experience represents a richer range of properties than colours, shapes, positions and sizes. I respond that cases of aspect-switching can be explained without holding that visual experience represents rich properties. I also argue that even if Searle and Siegel are right, and aspect-switching does require visual experience to represent rich properties, there is reason to think those properties do not include natural-kind properties, such as being a tomato.
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Barry Dainton (2010). Phenomenal Holism. Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 85 (67):113-139.
Christopher Gauker (2012). Perception Without Propositions. Philosophical Perspectives 26 (1):19-50.

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