Against causal decision theory

Synthese 67 (2):195 - 212 (1986)
Abstract Proponents of causal decision theories argue that classical Bayesian decision theory (BDT) gives the wrong advice in certain types of cases, of which the clearest and commonest are the medical Newcomb problems. I defend BDT, invoking a familiar principle of statistical inference to show that in such cases a free agent cannot take the contemplated action to be probabilistically relevant to its causes (so that BDT gives the right answer). I argue that my defence does better than those of Ellery Eells and Richard Jeffrey; and that it applies, where necessary, to other types of Newcomb problem.
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