A reply to Lormand
Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):274-278 (2000)
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Eric Lormand (2000). Comments on "a Neurofunctional Theory of Visual Consciousness". Consciousness and Cognition 9 (2):260-266.
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Eric Margolis & Stephen Laurence (1998). Multiple Meanings and Stability of Content. Journal of Philosophy 95 (5):255-63.
Benj Hellie (2007). 'There's Something It's Like' and the Structure of Consciousness. Philosophical Review 116 (3):441--63.
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