Beyond appearances : the content of sensation and perception

In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press. 434--460 (2006)
Abstract
There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally
Keywords Abstraction  Content  Perception  Sensation
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Citations of this work BETA
Ned Block (2010). Attention and Mental Paint1. Philosophical Issues 20 (1):23-63.
John Kulvicki (2010). Introspective Availability. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):208-228.

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