Graduate studies at Western
In Tamar Gendler & John Hawthorne (eds.), Perceptual Experience. Oxford University Press (2006)
|Abstract||There seems to be a large gulf between percepts and concepts. In particular, con- cepts seem to be capable of representing things that percepts cannot. We can conceive of things that would be impossible to perceive. (The converse may also seem true, but I will leave that to one side.) In one respect, this is trivially right. We can conceive of things that we cannot encounter, such as unicorns. We cannot literally perceive unicorns, even if we occasionally|
|Keywords||Abstraction Content Perception Sensation|
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