David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Mind 105 (419):467-474 (1996)
argues that the success of the backward causation hypothesis in quantum mechanics would provide strong support for a version of Reichenbach's account of the direction of causal processes, which takes the direction of causation to rest on the fork asymmetry. He also criticises my perspectival account of the direction of causation, which takes causal asymmetry to be a projection of our own temporal asymmetry as agents. In this reply I take issue with Dowe's argument at three main points: his claim that the backward causation hypothesis in QM is incompatible with my perspectival approach to the direction of causation; his defence of the fork asymmetry approach against a general criticism of mine based on the time-symmetry of microphysics; and his application of his preferred account of the direction of causal processes to the relevant cases in QM.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Phil Dowe (1995). What's Right and What's Wrong with Transference Theories. Erkenntnis 42 (3):363 - 374.
Brad Weslake (2006). Common Causes and the Direction of Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3):239-257.
Douglas Kutach (2013). Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics. Oxford University Press.
David Papineau (1992). Can We Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:238 - 252.
Phil Dowe (1996). Backwards Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes. Mind 105 (418):227-248.
Phil Dowe (1992). Process Causality and Asymmetry. Erkenntnis 37 (2):179-196.
Jonathan Schaffer (2001). Review of Dowe's Physical Causation. [REVIEW] British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 52 (4):809-813.
Huw Price (1992). The Direction of Causation: Ramsey's Ultimate Contingency. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:253 - 267.
Phil Dowe (2000). Physical Causation. Cambridge University Press.
H. Price (1996). Backward Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes: Reply to Dowe. Mind 105 (419):467 - 474.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads33 ( #43,567 of 1,012,676 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #64,884 of 1,012,676 )
How can I increase my downloads?