Graduate studies at Western
PRAMANA - Journal of Physics 56:199-209 (2001)
|Abstract||Bell’s theorem requires the assumption that hidden variables are independent of future measurement settings. This independence assumption rests on surprisingly shaky ground. In particular, it is puzzlingly time-asymmetric. The paper begins with a summary of the case for considering hidden variable models which, in abandoning this independence assumption, allow a degree of ‘backward causation’. The remainder of the paper clariﬁes the physical signiﬁcance of such models, in relation to the issue as to whether quantum mechanics provides a complete description of physical reality|
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