Badici on Inclosures and the Liar Paradox
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):359-366 (2010)
| Abstract | Badici [2008] criticizes views of Priest [2002] concerning the Inclosure Schema and the paradoxes of self-reference. This article explains why his criticisms are to be rejected | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesGraham Priest (2010). Inclosures, Vagueness, and Self-Reference. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):69-84.
Dale Jacquette (2010). Liar Paradox and Substitution Into Intensional Contexts. Polish Journal of Philosophy 4 (1):119-147.
Richard Kenneth Atkins (2011). This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421-444.
Dale Jacquette (2007). Denying The Liar. Polish Journal of Philosophy 1 (2):91-98.
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Emil Badici (2008). The Liar Paradox and the Inclosure Schema. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):583 – 596.
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