|Abstract||It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is ‘closed’ under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles avail- able to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accordingly the contemporary debate fails to engage with the sceptical problem in its strongest form.|
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