David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
It is nowadays taken for granted that the core radical sceptical arguments all pivot upon the principle that the epistemic operator in question is ‘closed’ under known entailments. Accordingly, the standard anti-sceptical project now involves either denying closure or retaining closure by amending how one understands other elements of the sceptical argument. However, there are epistemic principles avail- able to the sceptic which are logically weaker than closure but achieve the same result. Accordingly the contemporary debate fails to engage with the sceptical problem in its strongest form.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
By Duncan Pritchard (2005). The Structure of Sceptical Arguments. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37–52.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). The Structure of Sceptical Arguments. Philosophical Quarterly 55 (218):37 - 52.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):3-25.
Sven Rosenkranz (2012). Radical Scepticism Without Epistemic Closure. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):692-718.
Duncan Pritchard (2007). How to Be a Neo-Moorean. In Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and Externalism in Semantics and Epistemology. Oxford University Press. 68--99.
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck. Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
Christoph Kelp (2011). A Problem for Contrastivist Accounts of Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 152 (2):287-92.
Tim Black (2008). Solving the Problem of Easy Knowledge. Philosophical Quarterly 58 (233):597-617.
Stephen Maitzen (1998). The Knower Paradox and Epistemic Closure. Synthese 114 (2):337-354.
Duncan Pritchard (2000). Is `God Exists' a `Hinge Proposition' of Religious Belief? International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 47 (3):129-140.
Charles B. Cross (2004). More on the Paradox of the Knower Without Epistemic Closure. Mind 113 (449):109-114.
Jochen Briesen (2010). Reconsidering Closure, Underdetermination, and Infallibilism. Grazer Philosophische Studien 80 (1):221-234.
Duncan Pritchard (2006). Moral and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Value. Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 82 (1):19-41.
Added to index2010-12-22
Total downloads35 ( #59,791 of 1,692,502 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #181,267 of 1,692,502 )
How can I increase my downloads?