Cognitive ability and the extended cognition thesis

Synthese 175 (1):133 - 151 (2010)
Abstract
This paper explores the ramifications of the extended cognition thesis in the philosophy of mind for contemporary epistemology. In particular, it argues that all theories of knowledge need to accommodate the ability intuition that knowledge involves cognitive ability, but that once this requirement is understood correctly there is no reason why one could not have a conception of cognitive ability that was consistent with the extended cognition thesis. There is thus, surprisingly, a straightforward way of developing our current thinking about knowledge such that it incorporates the extended cognition thesis
Keywords Cognition  Cognitive ability  Epistemology  Epistemic luck  Epistemic virtue  Extended cognition  Knowledge
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References found in this work BETA
Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.
Monica Cowart, Embodied Cognition. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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