Oxford University Press (2006)
|Abstract||Dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true. This is a view which runs against orthodoxy in logic and metaphysics since Aristotle, and has implications for many of the core notions of philosophy. Doubt Truth to Be a Liar explores these implications for truth, rationality, negation, and the nature of logic, and develops further the defense of dialetheism first mounted in Priest's In Contradiction, a second edition of which is also available.|
|Keywords||Truth Contradiction Logic|
|Buy the book||$29.95 used (69% off) $37.76 new (61% off) $71.99 direct from Amazon (25% off) Amazon page|
|Call number||BC171.P755 2006|
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