David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134 (2004)
It is argued that just as the deflationist programme in the theory of truth has been a fruitful research programme, so a similar deflationist programme should be instituted in the theory of knowledge. Three possible deflationist positions are developed and assessed in this regard—Crispin Sartwell’s view that knowledge is merely true belief, Richard Foley’s contention that knowledge is merely true belief plus other true beliefs, and the radical version of subject contextualism put forward by Michael Williams. It is argued that the key elements of the positions advocated by Foley and Williams can be combined in such a way as to form a plausible deflationist theory of knowledge.
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