David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Southern Journal of Philosophy 42 (1):103-134 (2004)
The aim of this paper is to look at what a parallel deflationist program might be in the theory of knowledge and examine its prospect. In what follows I will simplify matters slightly by focussing on empirical knowledge rather than knowledge in general, though most of what I have to say ought to be applicable, mutatis mutandis, to knowledge in general. Moreover,note that it is not my aim to offer a full defense of a particular deflationist theory of knowledge, which would go well beyond the scope of this paper, but only to defend the utility of taking the deflationist program as regards the theory of knowledge seriously by showing that there is a plausible deflationist position available that is worthy of further scrutiny.
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
Robert Nozick (1981). Philosophical Explanations. Harvard University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Neo-Mooreanism, Contextualism, and the Evidential Basis of Scepticism. Acta Analytica 20 (2):3-25.
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