David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In A. Hatimoysis (ed.), Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement. Cambridge University Press 69-86 (2003)
There seem to be two kinds of emotion the rists in the world. Some work very hard to show that emotions are essentially cognitive states. Others resist this suggestion and insist that emotions are noncognitive. The debate has appeared in many forms in philosophy and psychology. It never seems to go away. The reason for this is simple. Emotions have properties that push in both directions, properties that make them seem quite smart and properties that make them seem quite dumb. They exemplify the base impulses of our animal nature while simultaneously branching out into the most human and humane reaches of our mental repertoires. Depending on where one looks, emotions can emerge as our simplest instincts or our subtlest achievements. This double nature makes emotions captivating, but also confounding. Researchers find themselves picking one side at the expense of the other, or packaging seemingly disparate components into unstable unions. I will defend a more integrative approach. For a more thorough treatment, see Prinz
|Keywords||Cognition Emotion Mental Metaphysics Psychosemantics|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Martha C. Nussbaum (2001). Upheavals of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions. Cambridge University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Demian Whiting (2011). The Feeling Theory of Emotion and the Object-Directed Emotions. European Journal of Philosophy 19 (2):281-303.
Demian Whiting (2006). Standing Up for an Affective Account of Emotion. Philosophical Explorations 9 (3):261-276.
Christoph Jäger (2009). Affective Ignorance. Erkenntnis 71 (1):123 - 139.
Matteo Mameli (2006). Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C 37 (1):101-121.
Matteo Mameli (2006). Norms for Emotions: Biological Functions and Representational Contents. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences 37 (1):101-121.
Similar books and articles
Adam Pautz (2010). Do Theories of Consciousness Rest on a Mistake? Philosophical Issues 20 (1):333-367.
H. G. Callaway (1990). Review of Fodor, Psychosemantics. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 33 (2):251-59..
William S. Robinson (1989). Psychosemantics. Review of Metaphysics 42 (3):619-620.
Radu J. Bogdan (1989). Does Semantics Run the Psyche? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 49 (June):687-700.
Hanah A. Chapman & Adam K. Anderson (2011). Varieties of Moral Emotional Experience. Emotion Review 3 (3):255-257.
Elizabeth J. Horberg, Christopher Oveis & Dacher Keltner (2011). Emotions as Moral Amplifiers: An Appraisal Tendency Approach to the Influences of Distinct Emotions Upon Moral Judgment. Emotion Review 3 (3):237-244.
Michelle Maiese (2011). Embodiment, Emotion, and Cognition. Palgrave Macmillan.
Pete Mandik (1999). Qualia, Space, and Control. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):47-60.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #226,753 of 1,789,999 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #264,810 of 1,789,999 )
How can I increase my downloads?