David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2001)
In this adventurous contribution to the project of combining philosophy and biology to understand the mind, Carolyn Price investigates what it means to say that mental states--like thoughts, wishes, and perceptual experiences--are about things in the natural world. Her insight into this deep philosophical problem offers a novel teleological account of intentional content, grounded in and shaped by a carefully constructed theory of functions. Along the way she defends her view from recent objections to teleological theories and indicates how it might be applied to notable problems in the philosophy of mind.
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|Call number||B105.I56.P75 2001|
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Stephen A. Butterfill & Ian A. Apperly (2013). How to Construct a Minimal Theory of Mind. Mind and Language 28 (5):606-637.
Nicholas Shea (2007). Consumers Need Information: Supplementing Teleosemantics with an Input Condition. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):404-435.
Ema Sullivan-Bissett (forthcoming). Malfunction Defended. Synthese:1-22.
Ruth G. Millikan (2007). An Input Condition for Teleosemantics? Reply to Shea (and Godfrey-Smith). Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):436-455.
Justine Kingsbury (2006). A Proper Understanding of Millikan. Acta Analytica 21 (40):23-40.
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