Greco on reliabilism and epistemic luck

Philosophical Studies 130 (1):35--45 (2006)
Abstract
I outline Greco’s response to the Pyrrhonian challenge to epistemic externalist theories of knowledge and offer two points of criticism. I also argue, however, that there is an account of epistemic luck available which can cast some light on the dispute that Greco is concerned with, and which could, in principle at least, be regarded as being in the spirit of the proposal that Greco sets out.
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    References found in this work BETA
    John Greco (1999). Agent Reliabilism. Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):273-296.

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