David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292 (1996)
Is non-cognitivism compatible with minimalism about truth? A contemporary argument claims not, and therefore that moral realists, for example, should take heart from the popularity of semantic minimalism. The same is said to apply to cognitivism about other topics—conditionals, for example—for the argument depends only on the fact that ordinary usage applies the notions of truth and falsity to utterances of the kind in question. Given this much, minimalism about truth is said to leave no room for the view that the utterances concerned are non-cognitive in nature
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall & Caroline West (2005). Moral Fictionalism Versus the Rest. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (3):307 – 330.
Alexis Burgess (2010). How to Reconcile Deflationism and Nonfactualism. Noûs 44 (3):433-450.
James Lenman (2003). Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):32–57.
Fritz J. McDonald (2009). A Deflationary Metaphysics of Morality. Acta Analytica 25 (3):285-298.
Similar books and articles
John O'Leary-Hawthorne & Huw Price (1996). How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275 – 292.
Richard Holton (1993). Minimalism About Truth. In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.
Josh Parsons (2012). Cognitivism About Imperatives. Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
Luca Moretti (2009). On Creeping Minimalism and the Nature of Minimal Entities. In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality (Routledge).
James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Folke Tersman (1995). Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
Mark Bryant Budolfson (2011). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies 153 (2):243 - 259.
Marian David (2002). Minimalism and the Facts About Truth. In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?
Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads65 ( #25,833 of 1,139,956 )
Recent downloads (6 months)7 ( #28,326 of 1,139,956 )
How can I increase my downloads?