How to stand up for non-cognitivists
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275-292 (1996)
| Abstract | Is non-cognitivism compatible with minimalism about truth? A contemporary argument claims not, and therefore that moral realists, for example, should take heart from the popularity of semantic minimalism. The same is said to apply to cognitivism about other topics—conditionals, for example—for the argument depends only on the fact that ordinary usage applies the notions of truth and falsity to utterances of the kind in question. Given this much, minimalism about truth is said to leave no room for the view that the utterances concerned are non-cognitive in nature | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesJohn O'Leary-Hawthorne & Huw Price (1996). How to Stand Up for Non-Cognitivists. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (2):275 – 292.
Richard Holton (1993). Minimalism About Truth. In B. Garrett & K. Mulligan (eds.), Themes from Wittgenstein. ANU Working Papers in Philosophy 4.
Josh Parsons (2012). Cognitivism About Imperatives. Analysis 72 (1):49-54.
Luca Moretti (2009). On Creeping Minimalism and the Nature of Minimal Entities. In Heather Dyke (ed.), From Truth to Reality (Routledge).
James Dreier (1996). Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth. Philosophical Studies 83 (1):29-51.
Folke Tersman (1995). Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency. Southern Journal of Philosophy 33 (3):361-372.
Mark Bryant Budolfson (forthcoming). Non-Cognitivism and Rational Inference. Philosophical Studies.
Marian David (2002). Minimalism and the Facts About Truth. In R. Schantz (ed.), What is Truth?
Glen Hoffmann (2010). The Minimalist Theory of Truth: Challenges and Concerns. Philosophy Compass 5 (10):938-949.
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