David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (3):421 – 442 (2004)
Intentional verbs create three different problems: problems of non-existence, of indeterminacy, and of failure of substitutivity. Meinongians tackle the first problem by recognizing non-existent objects; so too did many medieval logicians. Meinongians and the medievals approach the problem of indeterminacy differently, the former diagnosing an ellipsis for a propositional complement, the latter applying their theory directly to non-propositional complements. The evidence seems to favour the Meinongian approach. Faced with the third problem, Ockham argued bluntly for substitutivity when the intentional complement is non-propositional; Buridan developed a novel way of resisting substitutivity. Ockham's approach is closer to the Meinongian analysis of these cases; Buridan's seems to raise difficulties for a referential semantics. The comparision between the Meinongian and medieval approaches helps to bring out merits and potential pitfalls of each.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Anders Nes (2008). Are Only Mental Phenomena Intentional? Analysis 68 (299):205–215.
George Bealer (1996). Materialism and the Logical Structure of Intentionality. In Howard Robinson (ed.), Objections to Physicalism. New York: Clarendon Press
Susan Brower-Toland (2014). How Chatton Changed Ockham's Mind: William Ockham and Walter Chatton on Objects and Acts of Judgment. In G. Klima (ed.), Intentionality, Cognition and Mental Representation in Medieval Philosophy. Fordham University Press
Graham Priest (2005). Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Francesco Berto (2011). Modal Meinongianism and Fiction: The Best of Three Worlds. Philosophical Studies 152 (3):313-35.
Bernard Linsky & Edward N. Zalta (1991). Is Lewis a Meinongian? Australasian Journal of Philosophy 69 (4):438–453.
Francesco Berto (2008). Modal Meinongianism for Fictional Objects. Metaphysica 9 (2):205-218.
Gyula Klima (2013). Three Myths of Intentionality Versus Some Medieval Philosophers. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 21 (3):359-376.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads64 ( #70,245 of 1,934,371 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #195,883 of 1,934,371 )
How can I increase my downloads?