Radical scepticism, epistemic luck, and epistemic value

Abstract
It is argued that it is beneficial to view the debate regarding radical scepticism through the lens of epistemic value. In particular, it is claimed that we should regard radical scepticism as aiming to deprive us of an epistemic standing that is of special value to us, and that this methodological constraint on our dealings with radical scepticism potentially has important ramifications for how we assess the success of an anti-sceptical strategy.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-8349.2008.00160.x
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Duncan Pritchard (2009). Knowledge and Virtue: Response to Kelp. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):589 – 596.

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