Minimally inconsistent LP

Studia Logica 50 (2):321 - 331 (1991)
The paper explains how a paraconsistent logician can appropriate all classical reasoning. This is to take consistency as a default assumption, and hence to work within those models of the theory at hand which are minimally inconsistent. The paper spells out the formal application of this strategy to one paraconsistent logic, first-order LP. (See, Ch. 5 of: G. Priest, In Contradiction, Nijhoff, 1987.) The result is a strong non-monotonic paraconsistent logic agreeing with classical logic in consistent situations. It is shown that the logical closure of a theory under this logic is trivial only if its closure under LP is trivial.
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DOI 10.1007/BF00370190
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (1979). Logic of Paradox. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):219-241.

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Laura Goodship (1996). On Dialethism. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (1):153 – 161.
Ofer Arieli (2003). Reasoning with Different Levels of Uncertainty. Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 13 (3-4):317-343.

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