Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 130 (2):279-302 (2002)
|Abstract||A great deal of discussion in the recent literature has been devoted to the so-called 'McKinsey' paradox which purports to show that semantic externalism is incompatible with the sort of authoritative knowledge that we take ourselves to have of our own thought contents. In this paper I examine one influential epistemological response to this paradox which is due to Crispin Wright and Martin Davies. I argue that it fails to meet the challenge posed by McKinsey but that, if it is set within an externalist epistemology, it may have application to a related paradox that concerns the problem of radical scepticism|
|Keywords||Content Epistemology Scepticism Self-knowledge Semantic Externalism Thought Davies, M Mckinsey, M Wright, C|
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