David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 19 (1):57-69 (2004)
Fodor’s theory makes thinking prior to doing. It allows for an inactive agent or pure reflector, and for agents whose actions in various ways seem to float free of their own conceptual repertoires. We show that naturally evolved creatures are not like that. In the real world, thinking is always and everywhere about doing. The point of having a brain is to guide the actions of embodied beings in a complex material world. Some of those actions are, to be sure, more recondite than others. But in every case the contents of thoughts still look to depend, in some non-unique but vitally important way, on the kinds of doings they support
|Keywords||Analyticity Concept Metaphysics Pragmatism Rationalism|
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Andy Clark (2006). Material Symbols. Philosophical Psychology 19 (3):291-307.
Andy Clark (2005). Intrinsic Content, Active Memory, and the Extended Mind. Analysis 65 (285):1-11.
Marco Mazzone & Elisabetta Lalumera (2010). Concepts: Stored or Created? Minds and Machines 20 (1):47-68.
Derek C. Penn, Keith J. Holyoak & Daniel J. Povinelli (2008). Darwin's Mistake: Explaining the Discontinuity Between Human and Nonhuman Minds. Behavioral and Brain Sciences 31 (2):109-130.
Kevan Edwards (2010). Concept Referentialism and the Role of Empty Concepts. Mind and Language 25 (1):89-118.
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