Putting the brakes on enactive perception

Psyche 12 (1) (2006)
Alva Noë’s _Action in Perception _offers a provocative and vigorous defense of the thesis that vision is enactive: visual experience depends on dispositional motor responses. On this view, vision and action are inextricably bound. In this review, I argue against enactive perception. I raise objections to seven lines of evidence that appear in Noë’s book, and I indicate some reasons for thinking that vision can operate independently of motor responses. I conclude that the relationship between vision and action is causal, not constitutive. I then address three other contentious hypotheses in the book. Noë argues that visual states are not pictorial; he argues that all perception is conceptual; and he argues that the external world makes a constitutive contribution to experience. I am unpersuaded by these arguments, and I offer reasons to resist Noë’s conclusions
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Timothy Lane (2012). Toward an Explanatory Framework for Mental Ownership. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 11 (2):251-286.
Dave Ward (2015). Achieving Transparency: An Argument For Enactivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 91 (2).

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