David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Noûs 37 (2):325 - 341 (2003)
In his late paper ‘General Propositions and Causality’, Ramsey argues that unrestricted universal generalisations such as ‘All men are mortal’ are not genuine propositions.1 About this, as about much else in that paper, Ramsey had recently changed his mind. A few years earlier, both in ‘Facts and Propositions’ and in ‘Mathematical Logic’, he had argued that such generalisations are equivalent to infinite conjunctions.2 But by 1929 his ideas about infinity had changed, and it was concerns about the infinite character of unrestricted generalisations which led him to his new view
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