Semantic closure, descriptions and non-triviality

Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (6):549--558 (1999)
It is known that a semantically closed theory with description may well be trivial if the principles concerning denotation and descriptions are formulated in certain ways, even if the underlying logic is paraconsistent. This paper establishes the nontriviality of a semantically closed theory with a natural, but non-extensional, description operator
Keywords denotation  descriptions  non-extensionality  non-triviality  paraconsistency  semantic closure
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DOI 10.1023/A:1004608013532
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References found in this work BETA
Graham Priest (2006). In Contradiction. Oxford University Press Uk.
Graham Priest (1997). On a Paradox of Hilbert and Bernays. Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (1):45-56.

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