Some epistemological consequences of the dual-aspect theory of visual perception

Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):273-290 (2004)
Seeking whether our perception produces knowledge which is not only relative or subjective perspective on things, is to be engaged in the realist/anti-realist debate regarding perception. In this article I pursue the naturalistic approach according to which the question whether perception delivers objective knowledge about the external world is inseparable from empirical investigation into mechanisms of perception. More precisely, I have focused on the dual aspect theory of perception, one of the most influential recent theories of perception which unifies two traditionally opposite approaches to perception: ecological and constructivist. I have tried to show that the dualistic model of human vision does not support the majority of realist theses aimed at non-relativism, but supports only pragmatic realism about observational reports and the moderate realism about observational reports
Keywords Antirealism  Epistemology  Knowledge  Perception  Realism  Vision
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DOI croatjphil20044219
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