Should we expect to feel as if we understand consciousness?

Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):303-12 (1996)
We tend to assume that progress in answering the ‘hard question’ of consciousness will be accompanied by a subjective feeling of greater understanding. However, in order to feel we understand how one state of affairs arises from another, we have to deceive ourselves into thinking we have found a type of causal link which in reality may not exist . I draw from and expand upon Rosch's model, which specifies the conditions under which this self-deceptive kind of causal attribution arises. I argue that the mind-body relationship may not meet these conditions, especially because of its potential novelty and uniqueness. We should not therefore expect to subjectively feel we understand consciousness
Keywords Causation  Consciousness  Psychology  Reality  Science  Subjectivity
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