PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:253 - 267 (1992)
|Abstract||The paper criticizes the attempt to account for the direction of causation in terms of objective statistical asymmetries, such as those of the fork asymmetry. Following Ramsey, I argue that the most plausible way to account for causal asymmetry is to regard it as "put in by hand", that is as a feature that agents project onto the world. Its temporal orientation stems from that of ourselves as agents. The crucial statistical asymmetry is an anthropocentric one, namely that we take our actions to be statistically independent of everything except (what we come to call) their effects. I argue that this account explains the intuitive plausibility of Reichenbach's principle of the common cause|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
David H. Sanford (1985). Causal Dependence and Multiplicity. Philosophy 60 (232):215-.
Daniel M. Hausman (1998). Causal Asymmetries. Cambridge University Press.
Phil Dowe (1992). Process Causality and Asymmetry. Erkenntnis 37 (2):179-196.
Iain Martel, Probabilistic Empiricism: In Defence of a Reichenbachian Theory of Causation and the Direction of Time.
Mauro Dorato (2000). Becoming and the Arrow of Causation. Philosophy of Science 67 (3):534.
Douglas Kutach (forthcoming). Causation and Its Basis in Fundamental Physics. Oxford University Press.
Huw Price & Brad Weslake (2009). The Time-Asymmetry of Causation. In Helen Beebee, Peter Menzies & Christopher Hitchcock (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Causation. Oxford University Press.
Brad Weslake (2006). Common Causes and the Direction of Causation. Minds and Machines 16 (3).
David Papineau (1992). Can We Reduce Causal Direction to Probabilities? PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1992:238 - 252.
Huw Price (1996). Backward Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes: Reply to Dowe. Mind 105 (419):467-474.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads27 ( #46,539 of 556,837 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #27,255 of 556,837 )
How can I increase my downloads?