David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Issues 14 (1):326–348 (2004)
Let us focus on what I take it is the paradigm case of testimony—the intentional transfer of a belief from one agent to another, whether in the usual way via a verbal assertion made by the one agent to the other, or by some other means, such as through a note.1 So, for example, John says to Mary that the house is on fire (or, if you like, ‘texts’ her this message on her phone), and Mary, upon hearing this, forms the belief that the house is on fire and consequently exits the building at speed. Clearly, a great deal of our beliefs are gained via testimony, and if the epistemic status of our testimonybased beliefs were to be called into question en masse, then this would present us with quite a predicament. It is thus essential that we have some plausible account of the epistemology of testimony. Our primary focus will be on the justification for our testimony-based beliefs, though along the way we will say a little about other relevant epistemic notions like epistemic entitlement as well.
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Citations of this work BETA
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
Tim Kenyon (2013). Noninferentialism and Testimonial Belief Fixation. Episteme 10 (1):73-85.
Sandy Goldberg (2011). The Division of Epistemic Labor. Episteme 8 (1):112-125.
Jennifer Lackey (2006). Learning From Words. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):77–101.
Axel Gelfert (2013). Coverage-Reliability, Epistemic Dependence, and the Problem of Rumor-Based Belief. Philosophia 41 (3):763-786.
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