Graduate studies at Western
Brain and Mind 1 (2):245-56 (2000)
|Abstract||In Enchanted Looms , Rodney Cotterill defends the hypothesisthat conscious sensory experience depends on motor response. Thepositive evidence for this hypothesis is inconclusive, andnegative evidence can be marshaled against it. I present analternative hypothesis according to which consciousness involvesintermediate level sensory processing, attention, and workingmemory. The circuitry of consciousness can be dissociated fromaction systems and may mark an evolutionary advance from a priorphylogenetic stage in which motor outputs and sensory inputswere more intimately bound.|
|Keywords||Attention Brain Consciousness Memory Science Cotterill, R|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Rocco J. Gennaro (1992). Consciousness, Self-Consciousness, and Episodic Memory. Philosophical Psychology 5 (4):333-47.
Felipe De Brigard (forthcoming). Attention, Consciousness, and Commonsense. Journal of Consciousness Studies.
Christopher Mole (2008). Attention and Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (4):86-104.
Myrto I. Mylopoulos (2011). Why Reject a Sensory Imagery Theory of Control Consciousness? Topics in Cognitive Science 3 (2):268-272.
Pete Mandik (2010). Control Consciousness. Topics in Cognitive Science 2 (4):643-657.
Marcel Kinsbourne (2000). How is Consciousness Expressed in the Cerebral Activation Manifold? Brain and Mind 1 (2):265-74.
Rodney M. J. Cotterill (1995). On the Unity of Conscious Experience. Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (4):290-311.
Rodney M. J. Cotterill (1997). On the Mechanism of Consciousness. Journal of Consciousness Studies 4 (3):231-48.
Rodney M. J. Cotterill (2000). On Brain and Mind. Brain and Mind 1 (2):237-244.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads43 ( #30,760 of 729,710 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #26,098 of 729,710 )
How can I increase my downloads?