The normativity challenge: Cultural psychology provides the real threat to virtue ethics [Book Review]

Journal of Ethics 13 (2-3):117 - 144 (2009)
Situationists argue that virtue ethics is empirically untenable, since traditional virtue ethicists postulate broad, efficacious character traits, and social psychology suggests that such traits do not exist. I argue that prominent philosophical replies to this challenge do not succeed. But cross-cultural research gives reason to postulate character traits, and this undermines the situationist critique. There is, however, another empirical challenge to virtue ethics that is harder to escape. Character traits are culturally informed, as are our ideals of what traits are virtuous, and our ideals of what qualifies as well-being. If virtues and well-being are culturally constructed ideals, then the standard strategy for grounding the normativity of virtue ethics in human nature is undermined.
Keywords Culture  Normativity  Personality  Self concepts  Situationism  Virtue ethics  Well-being
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DOI 10.2307/40345397
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Duncan Pritchard (2013). Epistemic Virtue and the Epistemology of Education. Journal of Philosophy of Education 47 (2):236-247.
James Bernard Murphy (2015). Does Habit Interference Explain Moral Failure? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 6 (2):255-273.

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