Philosophy of Science 64 (4):244 (1997)
|Abstract||Physics takes for granted that interacting physical systems with no common history are independent, before their interaction. This principle is time-asymmetric, for no such restriction applies to systems with no common future, after an interaction. The time-asymmetry is normally attributed to boundary conditions. I argue that there are two distinct independence principles of this kind at work in contemporary physics, one of which cannot be attributed to boundary conditions, and therefore conflicts with the assumed T (or CPT) symmetry of microphysics. I note that this may have interesting ramifications in quantum mechanics.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Eftichios Bitsakis (2002). Forms of Physical Determination. Science and Society 66 (2):228 - 255.
Simon Saunders (2007). Mirroring as an a Priori Symmetry. Philosophy of Science 74 (4):452-480.
Jordi Cat (2005). Modeling Cracks and Cracking Models: Structures, Mechanisms, Boundary Conditions, Constraints, Inconsistencies and the Proper Domains of Natural Laws. Synthese 146 (3):447 - 487.
Huw Price (1996). Backward Causation and the Direction of Causal Processes: Reply to Dowe. Mind 105 (419):467-474.
Crawford L. Elder (2011). The Alleged Supervenience of Everything on Microphysics. Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1):87-95.
Abner Shimony (1996). A Bayesian Examination of Time-Symmetry in the Process of Measurement. Erkenntnis 45 (2-3):337 - 348.
Huw Price (2002). Boltzmann's Time Bomb. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (1):83-119.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads19 ( #64,404 of 549,128 )
Recent downloads (6 months)3 ( #25,740 of 549,128 )
How can I increase my downloads?