Three theses about dispositions

American Philosophical Quarterly 19 (3):251-257 (1982)
Abstract
I. Causal Thesis: Dispositions have a causal basis. II. Distinctness Thesis: Dispositions are distinct from their causal basis. III. Impotence Thesis: Dispositions are not causally active.
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    David Yates (2013). The Essence of Dispositional Essentialism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 87 (1):93-128.
    David Lewis (1997). Finkish Dispositions. Philosophical Quarterly 47 (187):143-158.

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