David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Metaphilosophy 34 (1/2):106--130 (2003)
The recent movement towards virtue–theoretic treatments of epistemological concepts can be understood in terms of the desire to eliminate epistemic luck. Significantly, however, it is argued that the two main varieties of virtue epistemology are responding to different types of epistemic luck. In particular, whilst proponents of reliabilism–based virtue theories have been focusing on the problem of what I call “veritic” epistemic luck, non–reliabilism–based virtue theories have instead been concerned with a very different type of epistemic luck, what I call “reflective” epistemic luck. It is argued that, prima facie at least, both forms of epistemic luck need to be responded to by any adequate epistemological theory. The problem, however, is that one can best eliminate veritic epistemic luck by adducing a so–called safety–based epistemological theory that need not be allied to a virtue–based account, and there is no fully adequate way of eliminating reflective epistemic luck. I thus conclude that this raises a fundamental difficulty for virtue–based epistemological theories, on either construal. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR].
|Keywords||EPISTEMICS, epistemology, Gettier, luck, Reliabilism, RELIABILITY, responsibilism, RESPONSIBILITY, VIRTUE epistemology, VIRTUES|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Linda Zagzebski (1996). Virtues of the Mind: An Inquiry Into the Nature of Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. Cambridge University Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
Edmund Gettier (1963). Is Justified True Belief Knowledge? Analysis 23 (6):121-123.
Citations of this work BETA
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Anti-Luck Epistemology. Synthese 158 (3):277-297.
J. Adam Carter (2013). Extended Cognition and Epistemic Luck. Synthese 190 (18):4201-4214.
Duncan Pritchard (2003). McDowell on Reasons, Externalism and Scepticism. European Journal of Philosophy 11 (3):273-294.
Duncan Pritchard (2005). Scepticism, Epistemic Luck, and Epistemic Angst. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (2):185 – 205.
Eric Kerr & Axel Gelfert (2014). The ‘Extendedness’ of Scientific Evidence. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):253-281.
Similar books and articles
Duncan Pritchard (2006). Moral and Epistemic Luck. Metaphilosophy 37 (1):1–25.
Jonathan Kvanvig (2008). ``Critical Notice of Pritchard's E Pistemic Luck &Quot. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 77:272-281.
Mark Silcox (2006). Virtue Epistemology and Moral Luck. Journal of Moral Philosophy 3 (2):179--192.
Duncan Pritchard (2008). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Luck, Revisited. Metaphilosophy 39 (1):66–88.
Robert Lockie (2008). Problems for Virtue Theories in Epistemology. Philosophical Studies 138 (2):169 - 191.
Duncan Pritchard (2007). Duncan Pritchard, Epistemic Luck. Theoria 73 (2):173-178.
Jesper Kallestrup & Duncan Pritchard (2014). Virtue Epistemology and Epistemic Twin Earth. European Journal of Philosophy 22 (3):335-357.
Guy Axtell (2003). Felix Culpa: Luck in Ethics and Epistemology. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):331--352.
John Greco (2003). Virtue and Luck, Epistemic and Otherwise. Metaphilosophy 34 (3):353-366.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads169 ( #20,254 of 1,792,217 )
Recent downloads (6 months)17 ( #47,179 of 1,792,217 )
How can I increase my downloads?