David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Mind and Language 20 (4):369–391 (2005)
Frege held that indexical thoughts could be retained through changes of context that required a change of indexical term. I argue that Frege was partially right in that a singular mode of presentation can be retained through changes of indexical. There must, however, be a further mode of presentation that changes when the indexical term changes. This suggests that indexicals should be regarded as complex demonstratives; a change of indexical term is like a change between 'that φ' and 'that ψ', where 'φ' and 'ψ' pick out relational properties that may nonetheless be conceived of by the thinker as intrinsic.
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Citations of this work BETA
Robert Williams (2008). The Price of Inscrutability. Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.
François Recanati (2013). Perceptual Concepts: In Defence of the Indexical Model. Synthese 190 (10):1841-1855.
J. R. G. Williams (2008). The Price of Inscrutability. Noûs 42 (4):600 - 641.
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