Kant's Legal Metaphor and the Nature of a Deduction

Journal of the History of Philosophy 41 (2):209-229 (2003)
This essay partly builds on and partly criticizes a striking idea of Dieter Henrich. Henrich argues that Kant's distinction in the first Critique between the question of fact (quid facti) and the question of law (quid juris) provides clues to the argumentative structure of a philosophical "Deduction". Henrich suggests that the unity of apperception plays a role analogous to a legal factum. By contrast, I argue, first, that the question of fact in the first Critique is settled by the Metaphysical Deduction, which establishes the purity of origin of the Categories, and, second, that in the second Critique, the relevant factum is the Fact of Reason, which amounts to the fact that the Moral Law is pure in origin.
Keywords Henrich  deduction  transcendental deduction  metaphysical deduction  fact of reason  factum  metaphor  legal metaphor  Kant  quid facti
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DOI 10.1353/hph.2003.0019
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