Metacognition and metarepresentation: Is a self-directed theory of mind a precondition for metacognition? [Book Review]
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 159 (2):271 - 295 (2007)
Metacognition is often defined as thinking about thinking. It is exemplified in all the activities through which one tries to predict and evaluate one’s own mental dispositions, states and properties for their cognitive adequacy. This article discusses the view that metacognition has metarepresentational structure. Properties such as causal contiguity, epistemic transparency and procedural reflexivity are present in metacognition but missing in metarepresentation, while open-ended recursivity and inferential promiscuity only occur in metarepresentation. It is concluded that, although metarepresentations can redescribe metacognitive contents, metacognition and metarepresentation are functionally distinct
|Keywords||Metacognition Metarepresentation Theory of mind Reflexivity Epistemic feelings Self-prediction Causal-contiguity Inferential promiscuity|
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References found in this work BETA
Timothy Williamson (2000). Knowledge and its Limits. Oxford University Press.
John R. Searle (1983). Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge University Press.
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
John Searle (1983). Intentionality. Oxford University Press.
Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2003). Mindreading. An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding Other Minds. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kourken Michaelian & John Sutton (2013). Distributed Cognition and Memory Research: History and Current Directions. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):1-24.
Kourken Michaelian (2012). Metacognition and Endorsement. Mind and Language 27 (3):284-307.
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2013). Scaffolded Memory and Metacognitive Feelings. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (1):135-152.
Nicholas Shea (2014). Reward Prediction Error Signals Are Meta‐Representational. Noûs 48 (2):314-341.
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2014). The Nature of Epistemic Feelings. Philosophical Psychology 27 (2):1-19.
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