Passage and Perception

Noûs 47 (1):69-84 (2013)
Abstract
I shall refer to all theories according to which time passes (including dynamic versions of presentism, ‘growing block’ theories, ‘shrinking tree’ theories, and so on) under the umbrella term ‘A-theory’, and I shall use the term ‘B-theory’ in the standard way to refer to the theory according to which time does not pass, and although events are ordered in time there is no objective present time.1 Many philosophers, both A- and B-theorists, have agreed that in experience we are, or at least seem to be, aware of time passing.
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References found in this work BETA
Alex Byrne (2001). Intentionalism Defended. Philosophical Review 110 (2):199 - 240.
Fred Dretske (1999). Mental Causation. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 1999 (7):81-88.

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Citations of this work BETA
Bradford Skow (2011). Experience and the Passage of Time. Philosophical Perspectives 25 (1):359-387.
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