Plan of the Talk
| Abstract | In the first part of this talk I show how some ideas in the new "4EA" branch of cognitive science (embodied, embedded, extended, enactive, affective), which gets away from the computer metaphor to talk about affective cognition as the direction of action of an organism, can be illuminated by Deleuze's ontology. Now that may sound ridiculous, as Deleuze's terminology is notoriously baroque – how could it ever "illuminate" anything? So I'm going to be using plain English translations of his concepts; I think his concepts are too good, too useful, for his terminology to be such a barrier to entry. Then I'm going to use this mixture of Deleuze and 4EA ideas to examine a case study which has, besides its metaphysical and psychological implications, some ethical, political, and legal ones as well. So to deal with them we'll deal just a bit with Agamben and Foucault. | |||||||||
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Frederick A. Elliston (1987). Sex, Ethics and the Practice of Law. Journal of Business Ethics 6 (5):355 - 360.
Thomas W. Smythe & Thomas G. Evans (2007). Intuition as a Basic Source of Moral Knowledge. Philosophia 35 (2):233-247.
A. Parr (2003). Review Essay: Between Deleuze and Derrida, Editors, Paul Patton & John Protevi. Critical Horizons 4 (2):305-314.
Dave Ward & Mog Stapleton (2012). Es Are Good. Cognition as Enacted, Embodied, Embedded, Affective and Extended. In Fabio Paglieri (ed.), Consciousness in Interaction: The role of the natural and social context in shaping consciousness.
John Protevi (forthcoming). Adding Deleuze to the Mix. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences.
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