Russell and the universalist conception of logic

Noûs 41 (1):1–32 (2007)
The paper critically scrutinizes the widespread idea that Russell subscribes to a "Universalist Conception of Logic." Various glosses on this somewhat under-explained slogan are considered, and their fit with Russell's texts and logical practice examined. The results of this investigation are, for the most part, unfavorable to the Universalist interpretation.
Keywords logic  universalism  Russell  metatheory  metalogic  Principia Mathematica  The Principles of mathematics  Ramsey  the variable  unrestricted variable
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00635.x
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W. V. Quine (1982). Methods of Logic. Harvard University Press.

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