The implications of an externalist theory of rule-following behavior for robot cognition

Minds and Machines 14 (3):283-308 (2004)
Abstract
  Given (1) Wittgensteins externalist analysis of the distinction between following a rule and behaving in accordance with a rule, (2) prima facie connections between rule-following and psychological capacities, and (3) pragmatic issues about training, it follows that most, even all, future artificially intelligent computers and robots will not use language, possess concepts, or reason. This argument suggests that AIs traditional aim of building machines with minds, exemplified in current work on cognitive robotics, is in need of substantial revision
Keywords Artificial Intelligence  Externalism  Rule Following  Science  Wittgenstein
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