Synthese 149 (1):77 - 96 (2006)
|Abstract||John Perry has argued that language, thought and experience often contain unarticulated constituents. I argue that this idea holds the key to explaining away the intuitive appeal of the A-theory of time and the endurance theory of persistence. The A-theory has seemed intuitively appealing because the nature of temporal experience makes it natural for us to use one-place predicates like past to deal with what are really two-place relations, one of whose constituents is unarticulated. The endurance view can be treated in a similar way; the temporal boundaries of temporal parts of objects are unarticulated in experience and this makes it seem that the very same entity exists at different times.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Heather Dyke (2003). Temporal Language and Temporal Reality. Philosophical Quarterly 53 (212):380–391.
Katalin Farkas (2008). Time, Tense, Truth. Synthese 160 (2):269 - 284.
Sebastian Watzl (2012). Silencing the Experience of Change. Philosophical Studies.
M. Oreste Fiocco (2007). Passage, Becoming and the Nature of Temporal Reality. Philosophia 35 (1):1-21.
T. Sattig (2003). Temporal Predication with Temporal Parts and Temporal Counterparts. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (3):355 – 368.
Thomas Sattig (2002). Temporal Parts and Complex Predicates. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 102 (3):279–286.
Josh Parsons (2000). Must a Four-Dimensionalist Believe in Temporal Parts? The Monist 83 (3):399-418.
Ian Phillips (2010). Perceiving Temporal Properties. European Journal of Philosophy 18 (2):176-202.
Tobias Hansson Wahlberg (2009). Objects in Time: Studies of Persistence in B-Time. Dissertation, Lund University
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #78,648 of 549,088 )
Recent downloads (6 months)0
How can I increase my downloads?