David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Consciousness and Cognition 12 (4):495-509 (2003)
What is a person, and how can a person come to know that she is a person identical to herself over time ? The article defends the view that the sense of being oneself in this sense consists in the ability to consciously affect oneself : in the memory of having affected oneself, joint to the consciousness of being able to affect oneself again. In other words, being a self requires a capacity for metacognition (control and monitoring of one's own internal states). This view is compatible with the hypothesis that the self is a dynamic representation emerging out of a higher level control system, - valuation control - whose articulation with control of plans and perceptual/motor control is discussed in the context of normal and pertrubed agency
|Keywords||*Metacognition *Self Concept *Self Perception Thinking|
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Citations of this work BETA
Peter Langland-Hassan (2008). Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity. Mind and Language 23 (4):369-401.
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Frederic Peters (2014). Accounting for Consciousness: Epistemic and Operational Issues. Axiomathes 24 (4):441-461.
Peter A. White (2015). The Pre-Reflective Experience of “I” as a Continuously Existing Being: The Role of Temporal Functional Binding. Consciousness and Cognition 31:98-114.
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Tillmann Vierkant (2012). What Metarepresentation is For. In Brandl Beran (ed.), The Foundations of Metacognition. Oxford University Press 279.
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