David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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European Journal of Philosophy 12 (1):106–126 (2004)
The *Tractatus* contains an argument that there are simple, necessarily existent objects, which, being simple, are suited to be the referents of the names occuring in the final analysis of propositions. The argument is perplexing in its own right, but also for its invocation of the notion of "substance". I argue that if one locates Wittgenstein's conception of substance in the Kantian tradition to which his talk of "substance" alludes, what emerges is an argument that is very nearly--but not quite--cogent.
|Keywords||substance name logically proper name singular proposition direct reference simples modal metaphysics Wittgenstein Tractatus|
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María Cerezo (2012). Possibility and Logical Space in the Tractatus. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (5):645-659.
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