David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268 (2008)
Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests that an internalist view of epistemic feelings is unable to account for the contrast between norm-tracking, educated sentiments, and illusory feelings.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Hilary Putnam (1975). Mind, Language, and Reality. Cambridge University Press.
Elliott Sober (1984/1993). The Nature of Selection: Evolutionary Theory in Philosophical Focus. University of Chicago Press.
Alvin Plantinga (1993). Warrant and Proper Function. Oxford University Press.
William Alston (2005). Beyond Justification: Dimensions of Epistemic Evaluation. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Kourken Michaelian (2012). Metacognition and Endorsement. Mind and Language 27 (3):284-307.
Nicholas Shea (2014). Reward Prediction Error Signals Are Meta‐Representational. Noûs 48 (2):314-341.
Santiago Arango-Muñoz (2011). Two Levels of Metacognition. Philosophia 39 (1):71-82.
Joëlle Proust (2014). Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.
Kourken Michaelian (2012). (Social) Metacognition and (Self-)Trust. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (4):481-514.
Similar books and articles
Joëlle Proust (2003). Does Metacognition Necessarily Involve Metarepresentation? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (3):352-352.
Kristoffer Ahlstrom (2010). On Epistemic Agency. Dissertation, University of Massachusetts at Amherst
Brian Ribeiro (2011). Epistemic Akrasia. International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 1 (1):18-25.
Thomas Grundmann (2009). Introspective Self-Knowledge and Reasoning: An Externalist Guide. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 71 (1):89 - 105.
Heimir Geirsson (2004). Contra Collective Epistemic Agency. Southwest Philosophy Review 20 (2):163-166.
Chris Calvert-Minor (2011). “Epistemological Communities” and the Problem of Epistemic Agency. Social Epistemology 25 (4):341 - 360.
Cillian McBride (2009). Communities of Inquiry and Democratic Politics. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 45 (1):pp. 71-74.
Heidi Grasswick (2011). Questioning the Role of Epistemic Agency: A Response to Calvert-Minor. Social Epistemology 25 (4):361 - 369.
Pascal Engel (2009). Epistemic Responsibility Without Epistemic Agency. Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):205 – 219.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads102 ( #36,451 of 1,789,722 )
Recent downloads (6 months)14 ( #59,060 of 1,789,722 )
How can I increase my downloads?