David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 108 (1pt3):241-268 (2008)
Controlling one's mental agency encompasses two forms of metacognitive operations, self-probing and post-evaluating. Metacognition so defined might seem to fuel an internalist view of epistemic norms, where rational feelings are available to instruct a thinker of what she can do, and allow her to be responsible for her mental agency. Such a view, however, ignores the dynamics of the mind–world interactions that calibrate the epistemic sentiments as reliable indicators of epistemic norms. A 'brain in the lab' thought experiment suggests that an internalist view of epistemic feelings is unable to account for the contrast between norm-tracking, educated sentiments, and illusory feelings.
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Kourken Michaelian (2012). Metacognition and Endorsement. Mind and Language 27 (3):284-307.
Nicholas Shea (2012). Reward Prediction Error Signals Are Meta‐Representational. Noûs 48 (2):314-341.
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Joëlle Proust (2014). Epistemic Action, Extended Knowledge, and Metacognition. Philosophical Issues 24 (1):364-392.
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