Conjunctions, disjunctions and Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals

Synthese 156 (1):33 - 52 (2007)
Consider the reasonable axioms of subjunctive conditionals if p → q1 and p → q2 at some world, then p → at that world, and if p1 → q and p2 → q at some world, then → q at that world, where p → q is the subjunctive conditional. I show that a Lewis-style semantics for subjunctive conditionals satisfies these axioms if and only if one makes a certain technical assumption about the closeness relation, an assumption that is probably false. I will then show how Lewisian semantics can be modified so as to assure and even when the technical assumption fails, and in fact in one sense the semantics actually becomes simpler then
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy of Language   Metaphysics   Epistemology   Logic   Philosophy
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DOI 10.2307/27653505
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References found in this work BETA
Alexander R. Pruss (2015). Possibility is Not Consistency. Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2341-2348.

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Xavier Donato Rodríguez & Alfonso Arroyo Santos (2012). The Structure of Idealization in Biological Theories: The Case of the Wright-Fisher Model. [REVIEW] Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 43 (1):11-27.

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