David Lewis's counterfactual arrow of time
Noûs 37 (4):606–637 (2003)
| Abstract | David Lewis (1979) has argued that according to his possible worlds analysis of counterfactuals, “backtracking” counterfactuals of the form “If event A were to happen at tA, then event B would happen at tB” where tB precedes tA, are usually false if B does not actually happen at tB. On the other.. | |||||||||
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