Freedom, determinism and Gale's principle
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In simplified form, the argument that I am defending holds that the incompatibility of our freedom with determinism follows from the conjunction of (1) a plausible supervenience claim which says that whether a human agent is free depends only on what happens during the agent’s life and (2) a freedom-cancellation principle of Richard Gale which says that an agent is not free if all of her actions are intentionally brought about by another agent. Improved versions of (1) and (2) are also considered
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Raymond Van Over (1974). The Psychology of Freedom. Fawcett Publications.
J. David Velleman (1989). Epistemic Freedom. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 70 (1):73-97.
Nicholas Rescher (2008). Free Will: A Philosophical Reappraisal. Transaction Publishers.
Leigh C. Vicens (2012). Divine Determinism, Human Freedom, and the Consequence Argument. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 71 (2):145-155.
Mark Leon (2000). Believing Autonomously. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 9:169-183.
Phillip D. Gosselin (1979). Is There a Freedom Requirement for Moral Responsibility? Dialogue 18 (3):289-306.
Vere Chappell (1994). Locke on the Freedom of the Will. In G. A. J. Rogers (ed.), Locke's Philosophy: Content and Context. Oxford University Press 101--21.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads41 ( #88,079 of 1,780,218 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #291,765 of 1,780,218 )
How can I increase my downloads?