David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philo 6 (1):49-58 (2003)
John Post criticized Richard Gale’s work for neglecting to consider Patrick Grim style arguments against quantification over all propositions. Such arguments would throw into question the possibility of an omniscient being and destroy the Weak Principle of Sufficient reason that Gale and I have defended, the principle that each true or at least contingently true proposition is possibly explained. Post mounts a Grim-style argument against quantification over all propositions. However, I show that, despite assurances to the contrary, Post’s argument depends on the assumption that if one can quantify over all propositions, then there is a set-like collection of all propositions. I show this by demonstrating that Post’s argument implicitly uses the Schroeder-Bernstein theorem from set theory. On the other hand, a linguistic version of Post’s argument, while not directly relevant to the theological cases, gives rise to an independently interesting paradox resembling Berry’s
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo 6 (1):33-48.
John F. Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo 6 (1):33-48.
Joshua T. Spencer (2006). Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being. Philo 9 (1):62-72.
Alexander R. Pruss (2004). A Restricted Principle of Sufficient Reason and the Cosmological Argument. Religious Studies 40 (2):165-179.
Eric Dietrich (2000). A Counterexample T o All Future Dynamic Systems Theories of Cognition. J. Of Experimental and Theoretical AI 12 (2):377-382.
Kevin C. Klement, Russell-Myhill Paradox. Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Michael J. Cholbi (2003). Contingency and Divine Knowledge in Ockham. American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1):81-91.
Sam Cowling (2011). The Limits of Modality. Philosophical Quarterly 61 (244):473-495.
Mark Schroeder (2013). Two Roles for Propositions: Cause for Divorce? Noûs 47 (3):409-430.
Laureano Luna (2012). Grim's Arguments Against Omniscience and Indefinite Extensibility. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):89-101.
Robert Lane (1997). Peirce’s ‘Entanglement’ with the Principles of Excluded Middle and Contradiction. Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 33 (3):680 - 703.
Shieva Kleinschmidt (forthcoming). Reasoning Without the Principle of Sufficient Reason. In Tyron Goldschmidt (ed.), The Philosophy of Existence: Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing? Routledge
Philip Hugly & Charles Sayward (1977). Prior’s Theory of Propositions. Analysis 37 (3):104-112.
Added to index2011-01-09
Total downloads13 ( #194,523 of 1,726,249 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #183,615 of 1,726,249 )
How can I increase my downloads?