Possibility is not consistency

Philosophical Studies 172 (9):2341-2348 (2015)
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Abstract

We shall use Gödel’s Second Incompleteness Theorem to show that consistency is not possibility, and then argue that the argument does serious damage to some theories of modality where consistency plays a major but not exclusive role

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10.1007/s11098-014-0414-9

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Alexander R. Pruss
Baylor University

Citations of this work

Modality is Not Explainable by Essence.Carlos Romero - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (274):121-141.
Consistency, possibility, and Gödel: a reply to Pruss.Michael Burton - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (12):3671-3677.

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References found in this work

Science Without Numbers: A Defence of Nominalism.Hartry H. Field - 1980 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Being known.Christopher Peacocke - 1999 - New York: Oxford University Press.
What we disagree about when we disagree about ontology.Cian Dorr - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon (ed.), Fictionalism in Metaphysics. Oxford University Press. pp. 234--86.
Fixing Frege.John P. Burgess - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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