David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Studies 152 (3):335 - 345 (2011)
The A-theory of time says that it is an objective, non-perspectival fact about the world that some events are present, while others were present or will be present. I shall argue that the A-theory has some implausible consequences for inductive reasoning. In particular, the presentist version of the A-theory, which holds that the difference between the present and the non-present consists in the present events being the only ones that exist, is very much in trouble
|Keywords||Time A-theory Presentism Induction|
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References found in this work BETA
Trenton Merricks (2007). Truth and Ontology. Oxford University Press.
Thomas M. Crisp (2007). Presentism and the Grounding Objection. Noûs 41 (1):90–109.
John Bigelow (1996). Presentism and Properties. Philosophical Perspectives 10 (Metaphysics):35-52.
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